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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Cyber-attacks are growing day by day and attackers are finding new techniques to cause 
harm to their target by spreading worms and malware. In the world of innovations and new 
technologies coming out every day, it creates a possibility of attacking a system and exploiting the 
vulnerabilities present in the system. One of the methods used for the spread of malware is the 
Portable Document Format (PDF) files. Due to the flexible nature of these files, it is becoming a 
sweet spot for the attackers to embed the malware easily into the PDF files. In this report, we are 
going to understand this flexibility provided by the PDF development and why the bad actors find 
it easy to embed viruses or malware into the PDF files. We will then look at how we can develop 
methods and techniques using python script to identify the malicious files and stop it from harming 
the systems in your network.  
 
Keywords – cyber-attacks, malware, Portable Document Format (PDF). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been a huge increase in the services that are provided on the 
Internet. With the use of smartphones and powerful computers, the power to do any task is readily 
available. When e-mail was introduced, people not only started sending messages anywhere in the 
globe, but also it enabled services such as sharing files over e-mail. When the memory on the 
physical devices could not suffice the needs, cloud storage was introduced which allowed 
unlimited storage to anyone, anywhere with an access to internet.  
However, these technological advancements have also brought in severe drawbacks. The 
amount of data that is available on the internet can be a possible target of a cyber-attack which can 
leak a person’s personal information and cause him serious damage. Cybercrime is on the rise and 
has become a profitable activity for the bad actors in the black market. For example, recently, we 
have seen a lot of malware attacks causing damage to governments, private sectors and the 
healthcare industry. These attackers are economically motivated which leads to development and 
evolution of these malware which are sustaining over the web.  
Portable Document Format (PDF) files have become an added challenge to stop the 
spreading of malware over the internet. The ability of including different types of content with 
embedded JavaScript and ActionScript codes makes it an easy target for malware attacks. Adobe, 
who came up with the PDF document type in the early 1990s, still publicly discloses some critical 
vulnerabilities in the PDF documents with vulnerabilities in the acrobat reader software which 
compiles these files, leaving behind serious potential threats for its users as mentioned in the 
research work [1], [2].  
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 Due to the flexibility provided by the PDF format, it has been a challenge to detect the 
malicious PDF files and often troubles the forensic analyst to find and hunt these files. Machine 
learning has been seen as a new tool to tackle such complex tasks in forensic investigation and 
cyber security [3]. But, to develop an efficient machine learning model, it is foremost important to 
identify the features which will help classify the files as malicious or benign. Machine learning 
was not originally developed for such investigations and therefore, it leaves some vulnerabilities 
behind which can be used by the attackers for their actions. Nevertheless, machine learning can 
benefit the forensic analyst and can greatly affect the detection process and help curb down these 
attacks.  
 In this report, we are going to see, what is a PDF file? Why is it easy to embed malware in 
a PDF document? How is it so effective? And how can we stop the attacks carried out using the 
PDF documents? 
            In this report, Section II explores the structure of the PDF document and gives insights into 
understanding how the PDF document is coded. In Section III we will explore the malware that 
are seen in the PDF documents and how they exploit the systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities 
in the PDF readers. Section IV talks about the various techniques and methods that can be used to 
find malicious PDF documents. Figure 1 shows the organization of the report and the topics it will 
cover.  
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  Malware Analysis on Structured Data 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Organization of the report 
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Chapter 2 
Understanding PDF 
 
In this chapter, we are going to talk about the PDF file and understand its structure which 
is a stepping stone of understanding how a malware is embedded into the files or how we can 
identify the abnormalities in the given PDF file structure.  
 
            PDF was invented by Adobe Systems in 1993. It supported text, images, hypertext links, 
bookmarks and thumbnails preserving them in their original formatting and appearance. The first 
revision of PDF in 1994 supported adding passwords to the documents and encryption to add the 
security feature with its flexibility in type of data that can be shared. Over the years, we have seen 
a huge increase in the use of PDF formats. Today, it supports 3D artwork, editable forms and 
animations which can be rendered in the PDF. AES encryptions have also been introduced for 
better data security and integrity. It also supports technologies such as JavaScript and ActionScript 
for visualizing text. 
 
            Let us now understand the syntax of a PDF document.  
• Objects: The document is a data structure which is constructed from a collection of different 
types of data objects. There are two types of conventions used to write these objects: 
o Lexical Conventions: set of character used to write the syntactic elements and objects. 
o Stream Objects: explains the writing of complex data type, the stream objects. It is a 
sequence of bytes comprising of a dictionary and the keywords stream and endstream 
within which the byte sequence is enclosed. Stream objects are indirect objects. Figure 
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2 below shows an example of how a PDF stream object is represented and the various 
components it contains.  
 
Fig 2. Example of PDF Stream Object [27] 
• File Structure: It helps determine how the objects in the PDF document are stored, accessed 
and updated.  
o A PDF document is a collection of objects which contains a single self-contained 
sequence of bytes with the associated structural information. Samir G. Sayed and 
Mohamed Shawkey in [8] talk about the structure of a PDF document. Fig 3. shows the 
typical structure of a PDF document. A PDF file comprises of four components namely: 
header, objects, cross reference (xref), and trailer.  
o The header provides information about the version of the PDF language. The header is 
included in the beginning of a PDF file. A PDF renderer ignores the file if its header is 
missing.  
o The body which consists of one or more objects. There are several types of objects such 
as strings, numbers, dictionaries, boolean, and streams. Objects have information 
including fonts, graphics, pages, and embedded codes such as JavaScript and Acrobat 
forms. Dictionary object contains simpler types of objects such as names, arrays, and 
numbers. Streams are used to store a large amount of embedded data such as images, 
multimedia, fonts, and JavaScript. Streams in benign PDF files normally contain text, 
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fonts, and pictures. However, streams in malicious PDF files often contain JavaScript. 
Attackers use compressed streams to hide the malicious JavaScript codes, otherwise 
these malicious codes will be plain text and easily visible.  
o The cross-reference (xref) table contains list of all objects and offsets to the beginning 
of these objects in the PDF file. The trailer of the PDF file provides information about 
the offset to the location of the cross-reference table and objects. 
 
Fig 3. PDF file structure [28] 
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o When a reader starts to process a PDF, it begins from the trailer object i.e. by finding 
the /Root and then constructs the indirect object and continues to decompress the data. 
Fig 4. shows a typical example of how a PDF document generated looks. 
 
Fig 4. Example of a PDF document 
 
o Incremental Updates: A PDF file can be updated by adding the new content to the end 
of the file and keeping the original content as it is. When a file is updated, a cross 
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reference section is also added which contains information of only the newly added 
objects or the objects that were changed or deleted.  
 
Fig 5. Structure of an updated PDF file. [29] 
 
• Document Structure: It describes the representation of the basic object types and the 
components of a PDF documents.  
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Fig 6. Tree Structure of a PDF document [29] 
 
o The root of the document is located in the trailer section of the document. The root is a 
catalog dictionary which defines information of the content, article threads, outline, and 
named destinations. It also contains information of how the data would look in the 
document. The document follows a page tree structure in maintaining the entire content 
which also allows various applications to quickly travel through 1000s of pages and 
fetch the content to display. Intermediate nodes called page tree nodes and leaf nodes 
as page objects are the two different types of objects in the tree structure. Acrobat 
Distiller and PDF Writer programs construct tress which are known as balanced trees.  
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Chapter 3 
Understanding the PDF Malware 
 
As we have seen in the last section, a PDF document allows for different kinds of objects 
to be embedded to provide a suitable way of sharing the information and content a user need.  Due 
to these options, it provides a possibility for the attackers to exploit these features of the document 
by embedding malicious codes or malware into the PDF. With such flexibility in the document 
itself, it becomes easier for the attackers to exploit the software which reads this document. Davide 
Maiorca and Battista Biggio talk about the examples of malware embedded in a PDF document. 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) report for adobe reader over the years shows the 
vulnerability report of the software which could be exploited by the attackers by infusing the 
malicious codes in the document. Figure 7 shows the CVE report for Adobe Reader over the years 
and the different types of vulnerabilities are can be exploited.  
 
Fig 7. Known CVE on PDF Document 
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Fig 8. CVE report for Adobe reader 
 
 JavaScript code, encoded streams and embedded objects are first choices of the attackers 
to exploit these vulnerabilities. It allows the execution of a remote code or create remote network 
connections as soon as the document is opened by the reader. One of the examples that exploits 
Adobe reader allowed downloading and installing a malware from a remote server. This was a 
BMP/RLE heap corruption vulnerability (CVE-2013-2729) which allows the heap to overflow and 
execute a remote connection code [3]. One more example of vulnerability in Adobe Reader is 
about the EScript.api which allows remote attackers run an arbitrary code or a denial of service 
(DoS) attack on the target system given in (CVE-2010-4091).  
 Davide Maiorca and Battista Biggio in [3] and Soon Heng Tan Mavric and Chai Kiat Yeo 
in [10] have both given examples on Javascript code embeeded in the document. CVE-2010-1240 
MALWARE ANALYSIS ON PDF   
  
  
   
12 
 
 
is a vulnerability which executes binary code simply when the PDF document is opened [3]. This 
was reported by Contagio in 2010. The sample of the code embedded is as follows [3]: 
<< 
/Type /Action  
/S /Launch  
/Win  
<< 
/F (cmd.exe)   
   /P (/c echo Dim BinaryStream > vbs1.vbs && echo Set BinaryStream = 
CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")  
>> 
…. 
Endobj 
 
When the reader opens the document, the file executed a command in the Windows Shell which 
is a Visual Basic script. This vulnerability was used to execute the Zeus Trojan which is a Trojan 
horse malware, generally used to steal private information such as banking records by keystroke 
logging.  
 The above-mentioned examples only compose a handful of malicious activities and 
vulnerabilities that can harness over the PDF document platform and expose the readers used for 
rendering these documents for user readability purposes. Thus, these attacks can get very 
sophisticated and complex. Identifying and finding them every time is a critical task. 
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Let us look at some of the PDF tags which can be risky and cause damage: 
• /OpenAction and /AA: It will execute a task or an action automatically. 
• /JavaScript and /JS specify the script to run which can execute a script or open a backdoor. 
• /GoTo changes the view to a specific destination within the document. It could also point to 
another document. 
• /Launch can be used to open a document or start/initiate a program. 
• /URI will fetch and access a URL. 
• /SubmitForm and /GoToR posts data to the given url. 
• /RichMedia: embeds Flash in the document. 
• /ObjStm: Hides an Object Stream. 
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Chapter 4 
Experiments and Results: 
Analysis of Malicious PDF 
 
We have seen how attacks can be made possible via the PDF document by embedding code 
into it. This helps exploit the reader and target systems. To avoid this, there are various analysis 
methods which could be used to identify malicious PDF documents from the non-malicious ones. 
These processes can be difficult to implement and consume time, but with the growing attacks and 
their consequences, it becomes more and more important to invest this time and find the documents 
produced by the attackers. We have collected a dataset of over 24000 files comprising of 9000 
clean PDF files and 15000 Malicious PDF files collected over the internet.  
 
Fig 9. Data Set 
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Let us study one of the open source tools which is widely used for pdf analysis.  
• peepdf:  
It is an open source python tool which helps to analyze a given PDF file. It can help a security 
researcher give valuable information and acquire all the necessary objects required by the 
researcher.  
Usage:  
 
Fig 10. Usage of peepdf tool 
 
It provides multiple options which can help a researcher dig deep and understand the structure and 
contents of the file.  
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Fig 11. Tools provided by peepdf 
 
 
Fig 12. Metadata of PDF Document 
The process to discover these malicious documents could be forensic analysis or learning 
based detection.  
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Fig 13. Detection rate of PDF malware  
S. Pai in [5] talks about forensic analysis as a method where we can use machine learning 
techniques to identify the important aspects that could classify a document as malicious or by 
focusing on the source of the document. If the source was a spam email or phishing website, then 
the content can be analyzed. Further analysis would explore the actions performed by the malicious 
code and their consequences on the system or the data.  
MALWARE ANALYSIS ON PDF   
  
  
   
18 
 
 
 
Fig 14. Analysis of PDF document 
A. Damodaran in [6] talks about keyword-based analysis. This depends on finding the 
keyword objects in the document as /JavaScript or /JS. If the keyword is found, the analyst could 
further study the stream objects and decompress them to understand their real function. If there are 
no keywords found, then the document can be considered to be safe for the user to access. 
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Fig 15. Injection of content in PDF files 
 
Another method is Tree based analysis where a tree is created showing the interconnections 
amongst the objects of the PDF document. The system begins with the trailer object of the PDF 
document to find the /Root keywords from where it starts building the tree [6]. The system then 
studies each object. Most of the malicious PDF files end with objects containing suspicious 
actions.  
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Fig 16. Tree Structure of PDF 
 
 Code based Analysis is based on studying the embedded code i.e. locating the /JavaScript 
code in the document and identifying what vulnerability it can exploit – known or unknown. The 
goal is to figure out the scripting code which are embedded into the files without getting into the 
internal depth of the files. This helps in finding if the lines of the code match to known 
vulnerabilities, and thus determine the maliciousness of the file.  
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Fig 17. Objects in PDF Document 
 
 Using the features found during the analysis of PDF files with over a dataset of 25000 files, 
a tool was created to check perform the task for identifying the features by reading the PDF file 
and identifying if it was malicious or not.  
 A PDF document also contains elements like JavaScript and URLs. To tackle the problem 
of harmful URLs, a ML model was used using logical regression. Logistic regression is a 
predictive analysis model which describes the data and draws inference relationship analysis for 
the binary attributes which depend on one or more nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio-level 
independent attributes. Implementation of this algorithm was done due to its property of handling 
multivariate dependent classes. 
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Performance of the model is evaluated using the confusion matrix to test various evaluation 
parameters as recall and area under ROC. Following are the results and visual representations of 
the obtained results.  
Results:  
True Positives: 10780 
True Negative: 10835 
False Positive: 1 
False Negative: 664 
Total: 22280 
 
Accuracy: 97.0153 
F-Score: 97.0078741 
Recall: 94.1978 
Precision: 99.9907 
The performance results are computed using the following formulas: 
Accuracy = (T P + T N)  / T P + F N + F P + T N 
F-Score = 2 ∗ (P ∗ R) / (P + R) 
Recall = T P / (T P + F N) 
Precision = T P / (T P + F P)     
 
 Evaluation Metric results obtained from the confusion matrix table show that the  
Accuracy and F-measure are the metrics which are used for the evaluation of the classifier  
performance. The F- measure is defined in terms of Recall (R) and Precision (P). If the evaluation 
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metrics have higher value, then the classifier is best suitable for the data set. The evaluation  
metrics results described effectively by the confusion matrix are: 
 
 
Fig 18. Confusion Matrix 
The entries in the Fig. 18 of the confusion matrix have the following meaning in our 
context: 
True Negative (TN): Malicious URL samples are labelled as a Malicious. 
False Positive (FP): Malicious URL samples are labelled as a Legitimate(non-malicious).  
False Negative (FN): Legitimate(non-malicious) URL samples are labelled as Malicious. 
True Positive (TP): Legitimate(non-malicious) URL samples are labelled as a Legitimate(non-
malicious).  
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Fig 19. Convergence Curve 
 Figure 19 gives the Convergence curve of the objective function plotted against the  
number  of iterations for the logistic regression method applied to URL dataset. 
 
 
Fig 20. Precision Recall Curve 
 Figure 20. Gives the precision-recall curve which shows the relationship between the  
precision (positive prediction value) and recall (sensitivity) for every possible cut-off. The graph 
is compute as:  
X-axis: Recall = sensitivity = TP / (TP + FN)  
Y-axis: Precision = positive predicted value = TP / (TP + FP) 
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Fig 21. AUC-ROC 
 Figure 21 shows the AUC-ROC(area under curve - receiver operating characteristic  
curve) which graphically illustrates the diagnostic ability of the logistic regression model, which 
has varied discrimination threshold. The ROC curve is created by plotting the false positive rate  
(FPR) known as fall-out or calculated as 1-specificity, against the true positive rate(TPR) known 
as sensitivity or recall, at various threshold settings. 
 
Python tool which analyses a file to determine the maliciousness of a file is implemented 
to give a verdict on a given input. This script reads through the content of a given PDF file and 
identifies the objects which are suspicious and gives the verdict based on the same.  
The results from scanning a number of mixed, benign and malicious files is given below: 
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Fig 22. Analysis of Mixed Files 
 Thus, we can see that the tool is working with 92.92% accuracy on identifying the 
malicious files and 92.46% accuracy on identifying the benign files when the entire input set is a 
mixture of both malicious and benign files. 
 
 
 
Fig 23. Analysis of Benign Files 
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Thus, we can see that the tool is working with 95.07% accuracy on identifying the benign 
files when the entire input set is of benign files. 
 
 
 
Fig 24. Analysis of Malicious Files 
 
Thus, we can see that the tool is working with 92.07% accuracy on identifying the 
malicious files when the entire input set is of malicious files.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
Attackers have become stronger and economically capable to carry out attacks. These 
attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated and difficult to detect. Attackers learn the 
vulnerabilities in the system and figure out the loopholes in the system that are analyzing such 
attacks and therefore, it is becoming more and more important for the development of methods 
and techniques that will stop the malware attacks on the extensively used PDF documents. 
 A PDF document is more and more flexible to embed malwares into it. We studied the 
various functions which can help embed malware into PDF. Malicious URLs, JavaScript and 
ActionScript code are the most exploited features of the PDF document to embed the malware.  
In this report, we have also looked at some examples of how malware is embedded into the 
document to take advantage of the vulnerabilities found in the reader system. We have also seen 
it with respect to the formation of the document giving us better insights. We have seen some 
methods that can be used to analyze and stop such attacks from happening such as forensic analysis 
and developing features to train models of machine learning. 
 However, attackers find loopholes in these techniques and are successful in obfuscating the 
actual embedded code to evade from such analysis findings. With the economic gains and usage 
of refined methods to carry out attacks, we need to provide security guarantees for the usage of 
PDF documents and thus require the development of algorithms which can help stop these attacks 
and prevent them. There are few vulnerabilities in the machine learning techniques which the 
attackers sooner or later will exploit. Thus, we need to have advancements in better machine 
learning techniques as well.  
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Chapter 6 
Future Work 
 Learning based detection methods are dependent on using machine learning techniques. 
Over the years, the use of machine learning techniques has increased. It helps simplify the complex 
tasks of identifying the malware and stopping the attacks. Machine learning techniques are based 
on pre-processing and feature extraction [7]. In pre-processing, the contents of the document are 
extracted without executing the file in the reader. These contents are analyzed, and suspicious files 
are submitted for further analysis. Suspicious files are executed on virtual machines or sandboxes 
to monitor their behavior. This method helps to bypass any means that can be implemented to 
bypass initial analysis. In feature extraction [7] [8], the objects such as /JavaScript are given more 
focus and these contents are extracted from the document for examination. The structural features 
of the document such as the names of the objects used are also considered for analysis and 
extraction of any suspicious information found. Anusha Damodaran, et al., in [6] describe various 
ways in which the learning-based models can be implemented. Samir G. Sayed and Mohamed 
Shawkey in [8] give an example of their model which is based on the learning-based detection 
methods. They use a feature extraction, feature selection and classifier model for training their 
model and finding malicious PDF documents.  
 
Fig 25. Learning-based detection architecture 
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 Thus, by learning the techniques from this report and the tools, it can be re-engineered 
into features to train a model and improvise on the results that we get out of the same.  
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